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Abstract. This article describes some counterintuitive consequences of instituting safety standards and
accountability practices at nuclear weapons plants.
Many textbooks on organizational psychology and management emphasize the need for explicit
standards and accountability for one's actions. Standards are posited to be necessary so that employees
will know what they're supposed to do. Accountability--some mixture of (1) positive and negative
reinforcement for doing what's supposed to be done and for not doing what's not supposed to be done
and (2) punishment and omission training for not doing what's supposed to be done and for doing
what's not supposed to be done--is posited to be necessary so that employees will be motivated to
manifest appropriate behavior and act on this motivation. Accountability also is posited to facilitate and
reinforce the comprehension and retention of standards. And so turns the virtual world.
In the real world, there are complicating factors comprising significant and complex disparities between
the needs of the organization and the needs of employees. These disparities too often lead employees
to viewing standards and accountability as impediments to reward--positive and negative
reinforcement--for themselves and their loved ones, not as objectives with which compliance yields
intrinsic pleasure and benefits for the organization and even the larger community. When these
disparities are not factored into systems of standards and accountability, disaster may strike. For
example, if violations of standards are otherwise to formally lead to noxious consequences, employees
can seek to cover up violations all together or to scapegoat the innocent. Both of these possibilities are
most easily accomplished through the unobserved falsification or destruction of data and through the
coopting or denigrating of monitors of standards. (The same dynamics are pertinent when reward-positive and negative reinforcement--is withheld until or further increased when behavior is "above"
standard. Here "above" standard quickly becomes standard, expected, and unmet via a sense of
entitlement. And again the same dynamics are pertinent when standards are met. Here the notion that
not meeting standards and meeting standards can result in similar reward--if one does not get caught
not meeting standards, and if not meeting standards and covering up one's accountability takes less
work than doing the job right--quickly becomes salient and robust in controlling employee behavior.
When cover-ups and scapegoating involve organizations geared to market products that satisfy needs
produced through marketing, the consequences may be unsettling as to views of human nature but are
otherwise unremarkable. When cover-ups and scapegoating involve organizations whose dysfunction
can lead to significant health hazards, the consequences can become staggering.
At facilities in Hanford, Washington, the above analysis seems germane in the lack of attention of some
Department of Energy authorities and contract site managers towards leaks from underground tanks of
radioactive waste--in liquid, sludge, and dried salt forms--into the ground and into ground water moving
towards the Columbia River. The analysis also seems germane for the unfortunate gaps in knowledge
about how to clean up the contamination and prevent additional damage.
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The bottom line? The selection, training, and management Issues for nuclear weapons plants must
confront what may be termed senses of entitlement--arrogating to oneself the "right" to disobey,
exploit, or subvert standards and accountability. Yet given that employees up and down the chains of
command may be subject to sense of entitlement, one may end up fearfully confronting a nuclear
version of the old Soviet Union. They pretend to manage us, and we pretend to comply. (See Buckalew,
L.W., & Buckalew, N.M. (1995). Survey of the nature and prevalence of patients' noncompliance and
implications for intervention. Psychological Reports, 76, 315-321; Dickson, R.E., Manusov, V., Cody, M.J.,
& McLaughlin, M.L. (1996). When hearing's not believing: Perceived differences between public and
private explanations for two compliance failures. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 15, 27-39;
Fogarty, J.S. (1997). Reactance theory and patient noncompliance. Social Science and Medicine, 45,
1277-1288; Wald, M.L. (March 23, 1998). Admitting error at a weapons plant. The New York Times, p.
A10.) (Keywords: Accountability, Bureaucracies, Organizations, Safety, Security.)
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